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Buying Votes: Examining Tufte’s
Political Business Cycle under an
Adaptive Expectations Framework
ANNA KONRADI

A Government is not supported a hundredth part so
such by the constant, uniform, quiet prosperity of the
country as by those damned spurts which Pitt used
to have just in the nick of time.
-Brougham, 1814
I. Introduction
In October of 1972, twenty-five million Americans
opened their Social Security checks to find that their
benefit payments had increased by twenty percent. In
the same mailing, recipients found a note informing
them that the new statute had recently passed
through Congress and had been signed into law by
President Nixon. Perhaps not surprisingly, Nixon
won his reelection bid the following month.
Since Tufte’s (1978) original publication on the
economic origins of election cycles, the public choice
literature on the political business cycle has argued
that self-interested incumbent politicians and their
parties can manipulate the state of the
macroeconomy for political gains. The literature
supposes that a pattern emerges within a politician’s
party’s term in office where there is “relative austerity
in early years” followed by a “potlatch right before the
[proceeding] election” (Norhaus, 1975). These cycles
can be understood to exist on top of the naturally
occurring business cycle as politicians attempt to
artificially bolster the economy above its natural
point right before the electorate goes to the polls.
These positive deviations from the business cycle, if
properly timed, have been shown to influence voter
behavior.
The relationship between the state of the economy
and the point within the election period has been
hypothesized most strongly for the United States

presidency. Perhaps better than any other politician,
the president has the unique ability to influence
outcomes in the macroeconomy through his use of
executive order and congressional influence.
Furthermore, studies have shown that the president
is the most likely to be praised when the economy is
in an upturn and the most likely to bear the political
brunt of the electoral backlash when it is
underperforming. One can then see why an
incumbent administration, while operating under the
limiting economic and political constraints, might try
and manipulate the short-run course of the national
economy in order to improve his party’s standing in
the upcoming elections.
While voters can certainly appreciate a growing
economy at any time during the election cycle,
political business cycles can be problematic if they
distort the true state of the economy from the eyes of
the voters. When the electorate sees that its income is
increasing and unemployment is falling, they may not
consider the possibility that these positive shocks are
not permanent and that these distortionary
endeavors will inevitably lead to inflation and
increase price levels in the long run.
This paper explores the existence of electoraleconomic cycles as they apply to recent US
presidential elections. It tests the hypothesis that the
probability of an incumbent’s (or an incumbent’s
party’s) reelection is significantly influenced by
movements in macroeconomic variables which can,
at least in the short run, be influenced by the
executive administration. Though this paper finds
limited evidence of consistently enacted political
business cycles, it defines a series of motivations that
might compel an incumbent government to
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manipulate economic variables in hopes of securing
reelection.
This article proceeds as follows: Section II reviews
literature related to the electoral implications of
macroeconomic variable movement under an
uncertainty framework. Section III explores the
theoretical model for this study and draws
hypotheses for empirical results. Section IV discusses
the research design and the empirical model. Section
V reports on the results of the study. Finally, Section
VI concludes the paper by drawing policy
implications, acknowledging the limits of the study,
and suggesting avenues for future research.
II. Review of the Literature
Arguments made for political business cycles were
initially theoretical in nature; however, in recent
decades, with the advent of strong Keynesianism in
the election periods after World War II, researchers
have sought to identify specific trends in the
macroeconomy centered around the US presidential
election cycle.
The core argument upon which the study of political
business cycles rests was first laid out by Edward R.
Tufte in his seminal work Political Control of the
Economy (1978), in which he conducts one of the first
empirical analyses of PBCs in the United States.
Throughout his work, Tufte made three important
contributions to the study of PBCs. First, he
demonstrated through historical research that
American incumbent presidents did consider
economic policy and the electoral calendar when
making fiscal policy decisions. More importantly,

however, the work revealed systematic movements in
US transfer policies in accordance with the timing of
elections, with the majority of the upswings occurring
in October and November of the election years.
Accompanying the policy movement were subsequent
upticks in Tufte’s chief economic variable: real
disposable income. Consider Figure 1, which details
the quarterly change in RDI and government transfer
payments surrounding Nixon’s 1972 reelection.
Figure 1 shows the quarterly path of RDI per capita
between 1972 and 1973, with its ever-accelerating
climb to the fourth quarter of 1972 followed by postelection decay. The exquisite political precision of this
economic course is atypical of the exactness of other
political business cycles, and must have partly been
attributable to sheer luck. However, one cannot
discount that much of the pre-election economic
acceleration had to have been the result of deliberate
planning and mobilization of policy instruments to
produce such significant changes in government
transfer payments.
Finally, Tufte was able to show (much weaker)
evidence of cyclical movement in other economic
indicators such as growth, unemployment, and
inflation. He hypothesizes that these variables are
more difficult to control inside an administrative
framework because they are so tied to real economic
conditions. As a result, policy makers must be
content to tweak them around the edges.
Beyond Tufte, major works by Lewis-Beck (1988) and
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2001) support the
opportunistic model. Lewis-Beck (1988) extends
Tufte’s model to a few of the major developed

FIGURE 1: Transfer Payment Growth in Election Period
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Western-European powers, including Germany, Italy,
France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The results
essentially mirror those of Tufte: evidence is varied,
but fairly supportive of the existence of economic
policy cycles and of growth in nominal indicators
(such as RDI), though the evidence is similarly
marginal in trending economic indicators to
countries’ electoral calendars.
A more recent article authored by Nadeau and LewisBeck, National Economic Voting in US Presidential
Elections (2001), focuses on the specific indicators
that influence the probability that an incumbent will
be reelected, which indirectly gives politicians an
incentive to implement certain policy instruments.
They point out correctly that individual voters use
information in different ways; in accounting for the
state of the economy, some will focus more on growth
rates while others will be more concerned with
inflation or unemployment. That being said,
politicians cannot simply optimize one of these
economic indicators. It becomes necessary during an
election cycle for the incumbent party to keep all
economic indicators in good standing with the
electorate. The problem is confounded then when we
recognize that many of these variables, such as
inflation and unemployment, are naturally negatively
related. Democrats may choose to focus on
unemployment rates, whereas Republicans might
choose to run political business cycles by keeping
inflation in check. Readers can then appreciate that
such policy measures must be intricately woven in
order to operate effectively.
Berlemann and Markwardt (2006) extend this
analysis to include forward looking expectations,
explaining that voters will incorporate speculative
expectations into their assessment of two presidential
candidates before an election. However, they
contend, there is a strong autocorrelative effect
between reelection and positive economic conditions,
helping to explain why, even in a prospective
expectations model, incumbent politicians who
preside over a strong economy are more likely to be
reelected for another term.
According to Filburn (2006), the basic underlying
theory associated with political business cycles is
simple and its basic premises have remained intact
since Tufte (1978). The theoretical foundation of the
PBC argument rests upon two realities and three
necessarily stated assumptions. Taken together, the
realities (which are generally accepted at face value)
and the assumptions establish incentive and
opportunity for incumbent politicians to engage in
electioneering in the form of producing electoral
economic cycles:

Reality 1: Incumbent politicians desire reelection,
both in terms of themselves and, to a lesser degree,
their party.
Reality 2: Incumbents control policies which can
affect perceived or actual economic outcomes.
Assumption 1: Voters favor positive economic
activity—high
growth,
low
inflation
and
unemployment, increasing wealth, and low taxes—
when retrospectively evaluating the performance of
an incumbent presidential candidate.
Assumption 2: Voters tend to discount past outcomes
relative to present events in their evaluation of
economic performance.
Assumption 3: Economic performance plays a
significant role in the voters’ decision to reward or
punish an incumbent politician at the ballot box.
All of these assumptions have been regularly
supported throughout the literature as “economic
voting” has become a major presumption through the
developed, democratic world. Taken together, these
points create a clear incentive structure for
incumbent electioneering.
Incumbent politicians
desire reelection (R1) and require electoral support to
achieve that end. The support is dependent (to some
extent) upon real economic outcomes (A3) which can
be manipulated by those same incumbents (R2).
Furthermore, the specific economic movements (A1)
and timing (A2) suggest that election years should
produce economic upswings where increased growth
and wages, as well as lower inflation, unemployment,
and taxes are anticipated.
III. Theoretical Model
One of the most common frameworks used to explain
the existence of political business cycles is the
macroeconomic model of aggregate supply (AS) and
aggregate demand (AD). Traditionally this model has
been used to relate the price level with the level of
output, and for this purpose it suits us well. The AD
curve relates the aggregate quantity of output
demanded to the price level, and the AS curve relates
the quantity of output supplied to the price level.
From a political economist’s perspective, a policy
maker’s attempt to manipulate the short run state of
the economy has two potential outcomes: The first
can be observed in the classical Lucas framework,
where increased government spending is anticipated
by the electorate, who then incorporate it into their
own expectations. The AD curve shifts right, but there
is an immediate response in aggregate supply, which
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shifts left and instantaneously returns the model to
full employment, long run equilibrium. These voters
are not likely to be influenced by short-term
economic boosts in the economy in the months before
an election because they recognize the incumbent’s
actions as self-interested and distortionary. The
economic impact of a targeted PBC will simply be
increased price levels.
FIGURE 2: AS-AD Under
Rational Expectations

additional transfers to the electorate to increase real
disposable income, or by encouraging the Federal
Reserve to lower interest rates. Because these
changes are unanticipated, from a Keynesian
perspective the impact of these policies will be felt by
individuals in the economy for a certain period of
time. Managed well, incumbent politicians could
conceivably alter the short run state of the economy,
with economic indicators reaching their maximums
close to Election Day. In terms of Figure 3, aggregate
demand shifts from AD to AD1 and output shifts up
to Y1. The price level also increases slightly from P1 to
P2.
However, like in the classical perspective, the benefits
of fiscal policy cannot be felt in the long run.
Eventually, the AS curve will shift left again, bringing
the economy back to its long run equilibrium, but at a
higher equilibrium price level.

An alternative explanation which is more prevalent in
PBC research circles involves Keynesianism’s
assumption of adaptive expectations. In this model,
voters can be swayed by pre-election fiscal policies,
even if those policies will have long-term costs after
the election. Consider Figure 3:

The cyclical nature of the political business cycle
phenomenon can then be interpreted through the
Keynesian lens. Figure 4 shows that the economy
grows in the period before the election, peaking as
time approaches the Election Day. Post election, the
reelected government, which is now insulated for
another four years, can constrain the economy in the
first two years of their term in office by raising taxes,
reducing government expenditures, and allowing for
higher interest rates.
FIGURE 4: The Political Business Cycle

FIGURE 3: AS-AD Under Irrational
Expectations, Short Run

In the months before the general election, the sitting
government can try to alter the short term state of the
economy by shocking AD to the right. This can be
done through increased government spending,

Furthermore, it is important to understand the
relationship between the political business cycle and
the naturally occurring business cycle. Whereas it
might be possible to isolate the variables influencing
electoral cycles, from a practical perspective, the
electorate is mostly concerned with the impact fiscal
policy has on the traditional business cycles. In
evaluating the state of the economy before heading to
the polls, the irrational voter superimposes the
political business cycle on top of the naturally
occurring cycle, and his evaluation focuses on the
additive influence of the PBC and the amount by
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which it can pull and distort the real economy.
Consider Figure 5:
FIGURE 5: The Distortionary Effect of the
Political Business Cycles

2) Variables for economic growth are
positively and directly related to
incumbent performance at the polls.
3) Unemployment
and
interest
rate
variables are negatively and directly
related to incumbent performance at the
polls.
IV. Data and Empirical Model

The solid line represents the naturally occurring
business cycle, whereas the dashed line shows the
perceived state of the economy when political forces
are acting. The effect of the PBC can thus be
understood as the deviation from the naturally
occurring cycle. This simple model operates under
the strong and most times unrealistic assumptions
that the business cycle period is concurrent with the
election cycles and these two cycles are naturally
procyclical. In reality, the real business cycle’s period
is independent of PBCs and the true state of the
economy in the months before an election could be
anything from growth to recession. In the case of a
recession, the government would still have a strong
incentive to operationalize a PBC as they try to
minimize the negative impact of the economic slump.
Under Keynesian assumptions for adaptive
expectations, this research moves forward with the
following hypotheses:
1) The
probability
for
incumbents’
reelection increases when economic
performance indicator variables are
optimized.

The macroeconomic data used in this study are
obtained from the Economic Indicators database,
published by the Council of Economic Advisors and
cover the time period starting with the presidential
election of 1948 and going through the presidential
election in 2004 (CEA, 2008). This time period was
chosen because all presidents during this period
have, to some extent, incorporated a Keynesian,
interventionist economic strategy into their
administration. Prior to this time, most politicians
did not believe that the government should involve
itself in the country’s major macroeconomic affairs.
Also, it excludes the World War II period, an unusual
era in history when large budget deficits were run and
many controls were placed on the economy for
national defense reasons.
The dependent variable for this study, a dichotomous
variable for the reelection of the incumbent president
or party was obtained from the American National
Election Study (NES). A separate independent
variable which looks at the relationship between
presidential incumbency and probability of reelection
(as opposed to party reelection) was also obtained
from the NES.
Table 1 details the individual variables, their
definitions, and the expected coefficient signs.

Table 1: Data Definitions
Variable
Dependent
REELECT
Explanatory
GROWTH
UNEMPLOYMENT
RDI
TRANSFERS
PARTY

Definition

Expected Sign

Dichotomous variable, 1 if president or in-party is re-elected, 0 if they
are not
Average growth rate of real GDP per capita in the first three quarters of
the election year
Percent of the labor force that is unemployed
Percent change in real disposable income compared to the year prior to
the presidential election
Percent change in government transfer payments compared to the year
prior to the presidential election
Dichotomous variable, 1 if the incumbent party is running an
incumbent candidate, 0 if they are not
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+
+
+
+

I expect the signs for the growth, real disposable
income, and transfer payment variable to all be
positive. Large growth or increase in per capita
consumer welfare should increase the probability that
individuals will view the incumbent president and/or
party favorably. In a Keynesian model of adaptive
expectations they should then be more willing to vote
to re-elect the president and/or party for another
term. Inversely, inflation is generally viewed
negatively by voters, as it decreases their purchasing
power in the economy. I therefore predict that high
inflation numbers will decrease the probability that a
president will be reelected.
The expected value for the party variable relies on the
assumption that a sitting president already has a
large organization to help him in his campaigning
effort. Whereas a new candidate from the sitting
president’s party would still need to win the
nomination against other candidates of the same
party, an incumbent president is usually insulated
from primary politics. He receives all of the party’s
campaign donations, which he can save to use for the
general election in the summer and fall prior to the
general election in November (while non-incumbents
have to spend large sums of money during the
primary season to win reelection). Therefore, I
predict that presidential incumbency will have a
positive effect on the party’s reelection bid.

15 presidential election cycles (every election between
1948 and 2004). The small number of individual
election cases creates a significant degrees of freedom
problem, and as a consequence, OLS regressions
using multiple independent variables could not be
run responsibly. In an attempt to partially alleviate
this problem, data for the economic indicators were
collected in quarterly terms, and the election
variables were coded for their respective years. This
meant, for example, that every quarter in 1996 was
coded as ‘reelect’ for the dependent variable.
TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Dependent
REELECT
Explanatory
GROWTH
UNEMPLOYMENT
RDI
TRANSFERS
PARTY
N=248

Mean

Standard
Deviation

0.533

0.516

3.399
5.562

2.332
1.504

3.408
1.463
0.533

4.310
7.618
0.516

P(reelection) = α + β1(Growth) + β2(Inflation) +
β3(RDI) + β4(Transfers) + β5(Party) + ε

Recall from the theory section of this paper that
political business cycles are hypothesized to occur
over a four year period, beginning with fiscal
bolstering in the two years preceding the presidential
election, followed by a downturn in the two years
after the president is inaugurated. Tables 3 and 4
report the descriptive statistics for both these ‘up’
(the two years before the national election) and
‘down’ (the two years after the national election)
periods. Theoretically, the GROWTH, RDI, and
TRANSFER variables should be larger as parties and
candidates
run
for
reelection,
while
UNEMPLOYMENT should fall. Thus, I ran a series of
one-tailed 2-sample t-tests to compare the values of
the indicators around the time of the election.

V. Results and Discussion

TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistic for ‘Up’ Years

The results presented in this paper, while possibly
clinically important for strategizing purposes given
the small sample size, have not proven statistically
significant.

Variable

The explanatory variables will be subjected to
logistical regression to determine their significance
predicting executive branch party reelection
outcomes. However, because this study only uses
post-Keynesian presidential election data, any model
that included all of the independent variables listed in
Table 1 above would be grossly over-specified.
Instead, to take account of the degrees of freedom
problem in this dataset, I will test the variables in
pairs. However, for simplicity’s sake, the theoretical
empirical model is delineated here below:

Descriptives:
Running initial descriptive calculations helps to paint
a broad image of what is going on in the data. In
Table 2, I have presented the descriptive statistics for
each variable used. Note that I am using data for only

Min

Max

Mean

Std.
Dev.
3.37
1.57
4.16
7.41

GROWTH
-8.07
13.14 3.65*
UNEMPLOYMENT 2.83
10.37 5.51
RDI
-8.95
18.58 3.79*
TRANSFERS
-33.97 53.90 1.21
N=126
*indicates statistical significance at the α=0.10 level
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TABLE 4: Descriptive Statistics for ‘Down’
Years
Variable

Min

Max

Mean

Std.
Dev.
4.47
1.43
4.45
7.86

GROWTH
-10.87 17.19
2.93*
UNEMPLOYMENT 2.57
10.67 5.63
RDI
-8.29
29.89 3.01*
TRANSFERS
-31.19 71.91
1.73
N=120
*indicates statistical significance at the α=0.10 level

The results of these comparison of means tests were
mixed. The growth and real disposable income
variables both prove to be significantly larger in the
pre-election period, indicating that there may be
some pre-election fiscal bolstering for these
indicators. This makes sense, as previous literature
predicts that rational individuals will vote
retrospectively, looking at their financial situation
when deciding whether to reelect the in-party.
Policymakers, aware of this general trend, would
therefore have an incentive to stimulate the economy
as voters make their reelect or oust decisions.
The unemployment variable between the ‘up’ and
‘down’ periods did not prove to be statistically
significant, though its inability to reach the
significance threshold does not disprove the
hypothesized relationship between unemployment
and the political business cycle.
It is interesting to note that the change in transfer
payments is, on average, larger during the ‘down’
periods of the political business cycle. This could be
due to the fact that much of the change that can occur
is driven by automatic stabilizers, which are partly
independent of the election cycle.
Regressions:
The OLS regression presented in Table 5 regresses
the real GDP growth indicator (the real GDP growth
rate between quarters from 1948-2006) against RDI,
transfer income, unemployment, and reelection
variables in the ‘up’ years of the hypothesized
political business cycle. While this regression does
not expressly look at reelection as the independent
variable relying on economic factors, it does allow for
additional degrees of freedom cases to be calculated
for every quarter between 1948 and 2008.

TABLE 5: RGDP Regression
Variables
CONSTANT
Explanatory
GROWTH
UNEMPLOYMENT
RDI
TRANSFERS
PARTY

2.009**
(2.001)
0.872**
(5.678)
0.054
(0.321)
0.415***
(6.098)
-0.129
(-3.491)***
-0.241
(-0.384)

N=126
R2=0.357
**indicates statistical significance at the α=0.05 level
***indicates statistical significance at the α=0.01 level
The results of this regression do not allow me to make
any general statements about the pull of the general
election on the national economy, although the other
economic indicators generally have the expected
coefficients. Note that while unemployment has a
positive coefficient, it does not reach the significance
threshold in this regression. The party reelection
variable is also insignificant statistically. Thus, the
incumbent party having a candidate does not have a
significant effect on real GDP.
The PARTY variable, which is defined in every
quarter of an election year in which an incumbent is
running, is also insignificant and is not an important
determinate of real GDP.
A second series of probit regressions looks at the
relationship between probability of party reelection to
the executive office and economic indicators. The
data used in this model include all election year
quarters since 1948. As mentioned above, due to a
limited number of cases, these regressions are
restricted to bivariate comparisons between
variables. See Table 6 on the following page:

The Park Place Economist, Volume XVII ▪ 45

TABLE 6: Election Regressions
Variable
CONSTANT
Explanatory
RGDP

Model 1
0.142
(0.85)

Model 2
-0.013
(0.408)

Model 3
-0.015
(-0.13)

-0.044
(-1.31)

UNEMPLOYMENT

government programs that are not as subject
to automatic fluctuations. In order to increase
the sample size, it might also prove useful to
look at data from many developed countries
with electoral systems similar to that in the
United States to determine if such systems
have similar political business cycles.

-0.013
(-0.03)

TRANSFERS

REFERENCES
-0.004
(-0.26)

RDI
Pseudo R2

Model 4
-0.053
(-0.35)

0.01

0.00

0.0004

These models show no clear relationship between the
economic indicators and election years. This is perhaps
not too surprising, however, when we take into account
the small sample size (only 15 election cases) and the
variety of fiscal control mechanisms that presidents
might use to manipulate the economy. It could well be
that the indicators observed for this paper were too
broad to take account of specific programs.
VI. Conclusions
This study attempted to extend Tufte’s theories on
political business cycles into the present. Unfortunately,
significant results proved difficult to find.
It is important to consider the possibility that, while
Tufte’s theories predicted that voters were adaptive in
their economic estimations, voters in more recent
decades have come to adjust their expectations about
the economy to fit with the presidential elections. When
they see that their social security or Medicare payments
are increasing, they may calculate that this is a short run
adjustment in government policy designed to increase
the vote share of the incumbent party. Realizing as
much, voters may not be inclined to cast their ballots for
a specific incumbent party on the basis of short term
economic trends. In this sense, we might say that the
American electorate has become more rational minded
in recent decades.
The other possibility that exists is that the political
business cycle, while functional theoretically, is not
significantly played out on the national stage. Many
adjustments that occur on the fiscal side of the economy
are automatic stabilizers, such as transfers, and their
movements depend more on the state of the real
economy than they do on politician’s election cycles.
It could also be the case that the variables observed in
this study are too broad to adequately capture the
intricacies of government policymaking. Future research
would thus be well served to examine more specific

0.009
(0.32)
0.0006
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